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Tit for Tat: sticklebacks
{Gasterosteus aculeatus) "trusting"
a cooperating partner
Individual three-spined sticklebacks {Gasterosteus aculeatus) moved closer to a predatory trout
when a "cooperator" stickleback, which the test fish could see through a one-way mirror,
swam up to the predator than when a "defector" stickleback appeared to swim only half as
close to the predator. After four training runs with both types of partners, the former
cooperator. also defected. The test fish continued to move closer to the predator in the
presence of the former cooperator even though both the former cooperator and the defector
now appeared to stop in their approach to the predator at the same distance. This shows
that probable partners build up trust. [Behav Ecol 1990; 1:7-11]
When a pike (Esox Indus) is stalking ashoal of minnows (Phoxinus phoxi-
nus), individual minnows leave the shoal and
approach to within four to six body lengths
from the predator, wait there for a few sec-
onds, and then slowly turn and go back to
the shoal (Magurran et al., 1985; Magurran,
Pitcher, 1937; Pitcher et al., 1986). It has
been shown that the fish gather information
about the predator's identity, precise loca-
tion, and current motivational state during
such inspection visits (Licht, 1989; Magur-
ran, Girling, 1986; Magurran, Higham,
1988). Two minnows, or sticklebacks (Gas-
terosteus aculeatus), will approach a predator
more closely than will single fish (Milinski,
1985; Pitcher et al., 1986). Two inspectors
gain similar information but have only half
the risk of being eaten per individual com-
pared to singletons. Although the two fish
provide each other with the shoal advantage
(Hamilton, 1971), the fish that initiates the
next step forward has to rely on the other
one following. The two fish are probably in
a "prisoner's dilemma," a "game" in which
defection rather than cooperation is the evo-
lutionarily stable strategy (Milinski, 1987,
1990). This only applies if the game is played
either once or a predictable number of times.
Insuch a scenario, mutual cooperation would
yield the highest benefit for both individuals
(Axelrod, Hamilton, 1981; May, 1981; May-
nard Smith, 1982; Trivers, 1971).
A solution to the problem posed by the
prisoner's dilemma is provided by the co-
operation strategy of Tit for Tat; that is,
cooperating in the first game and thereafter
doing what your partner did in the preced-
ing game. This strategy has been shown to
be very successful if the players have a cer-
tain minimum probability of meeting again
in the same situation (Axelrod, 1984; Ax-
elrod, Dion, 1988; Axelrod, Hamilton, 1981;
Boyd, 1989; Feldman, Thomas, 1987; No-
wak, Sigmund, 1989; Peck, Feldman, 1986).
Although reciprocity has been demonstrat-
ed in a number of species (Dugatkin, 1988;
Fischer, 1980; Ligon, Ligon, 1978; Lom-
bardo, 1985; Milinski, 1987; Packer, 1977;
Seyfarth, Cheney, 1984; Whitehead, 1987;
Wilkinson, 1984), only a few investigations
have demonstrated experimentally that a
number of the conditions and predictions of
Tit for Tat are fulfilled (Dugatkin, 1988;
Lombardo, 1985; Milinski, 1987, 1990;
Whitehead, 1987; Wilkinson, 1984).
Milinski (1987) used a system of mirrors
so that single sticklebacks approaching a live
predator were provided with either a sim-
ulated cooperating companion or a simulat-
ed defecting one. In both cases the test fish
behaved according to Tit for Tat. By re-
peating the mirror experiments with gup-
pies (Poecilia rcticulata), Dugatkin (1988)
found almost the same results. Individual
sticklebacks in a group of four have their
preferred partner with whom they repeat-
edly perform inspection visits (Milinski et
al., in press). May (1987) has suggested that
early encounters could be used to build up
trust between partners, so that eventually
they may undertake an enterprise with a
large reward. In the present study we in-
vestigate whether single sticklebacks prefer
to join the more cooperative of two possible
partners and whether they are willing to "pay
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Figure 1
Experimental set-up as
viewed from above. Outer
compartments contain
conditioned sticklebacks;
experimental compartments
in middle contains test fish
and plants; predator
compartment at right
contains a rainbow trout.
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in advance"—that is, approach the predator
more closely—when the more cooperative
partner is following.
Materials and methods
We divided the experimental tank (80 x 35
cm) into four compartments: an experimen-
tal compartment (33 x 14.5 cm) containing
two plants (Vallbneria sp.) at one end; a pred-
ator compartment (33 x 14.5 cm) contain-
ing a rainbow trout {Oncorhynchus mykiss,
about 28 cm long); and two outer compart-
ments (80 x 9 cm), one on either side of the
experimental and predator compartments
(Figure 1). Each of the outer compartments
had a start section at one end from which a
conditioned stickleback, could be made to
swim toward the other end by opening a
sliding door and switching on a weak green
light positioned at the far end, outside the
backwall. When a conditioned stickleback
came within 5 cm of a net positioned at the
same distance as the glass partition between
the experimental and predator compart-
ments, we switched off the green light and
switched on another green light positioned
at the starting end. This made the condi-
tioned fish swim back to the start section,
where it was then trapped behind the sliding
door. We used two different female stick-
lebacks that we had individually conditioned
to swim toward gTeen lights by rewarding
this behavior after a variable ratio schedule
with Tubifex worms under closed-economy
conditions for several weeks. We had fed the
trout sticklebacks.
Both long walls of the experimental com-
partment consisted of one-way mirrors. We
illuminated each of the two outer compart-
ments from above using two white lamps
(Osram Concentra PAR-EC flood, 80 W)
suspended 78 cm above the water level (18
cm). The experimental and predator com-
partments were illuminated only by the light
passing through the mirrors. Thus, a con-
ditioned fish could be seen from the exper-
imental compartment, into which the con-
ditioned fish, however, could not see. We
set up a video camera above the experimen-
tal tank to film the experimental and pred-
ator compartments.
Before the start of each trial, we kept the
two conditioned sticklebacks in their indi-
vidual start sections and released a test stick-
leback above the plants in the experimental
compartment. We positioned an opaque
partition in front of the predator compart-
ment and another in front of a one-way mir-
ror covering the half (16.5 cm) of the ex-
perimental compartment closest to the
predator. The test fish was given 30 min to
become accustomed to the tank. At the start
of each trial, we placed the trout in the pred-
ator compartment and raised the opaque
partition in front of it. Then we sent one of
the two conditioned sticklebacks forward and
back again in the outer compartment before
trapping it in its start section. Then the sec-
ond conditioned fish was made to swim in
the same way. We sent the two conditioned
fish alternately forward and back four times
each (this was the training of the test fish).
We alternated the sequence of the condi-
tioned fish and the position of the opaque
partition from side to side between different
test fish so that each possible combination
was met almost equally often. After eight
training runs, we placed a second partition
in the equivalent position to the first, that
is, in front of the opposite one-way mirror
in the half closest to the predator (Figure
1). As before, we sent each conditioned fish
alternately forward and back four times (this
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constituted the testing phase). We used each
of 48 test fish only once.
As well as video recording the behavior
of both the test fish and the predator, we
observed the course of each conditioned fish
directly from behind a blind. We divided the
part of the outer compartments between
sliding door and net into six sequentially
numbered sections of equal length. We used
these numbered sections to record the po-
sition of the conditioned fish. The shortest
distance between the test fish and the glass
partition next to the predator was measured
during each run of a conditioned fish both
when the conditioned fish was in the half of
the outer compartment closer to the pred-
ator and when it was in the other half on its
way back to the start section.
Results
In the majority of the eight training runs,
the test fish approached the predator in syn-
chrony with a conditioned fish. Because of
the opaque partition that was positioned on
one side of the experimental compartment,
the test fish was able to see one of the con-
ditioned fish (the "defector") swimming
about half the available distance toward the
predator and the other fish (the "coopera-
tor") swimming until it was close to the trout.
The trout tried to attack each test fish sev-
eral times between the start of a trial and
the last test run, especially when the test fish
was close to the trout.
During each of the training runs, the test
fish came closer to the predator with the
cooperator than with the defector (Figure
2). The difference between the means of all
four training runs combined with either
companion was significant (p < .02, one-
tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks
test). In all eight test runs both of the con-
ditioned fish were seen to approach only
halfway to the predator. In the second and
third test runs, the test fish tended to move
closer to the predator with the conditioned
fish that had cooperated during the training
runs (Figure 2). When the second partition
was placed in front of the cooperator's side
immediately before the first test run, the test
fish appeared frightened by this distur-
bance. This is supported by the fact that 25
test fish which started with the cooperator
in the first test run tended to approach the
predator more closely with the former de-
fector whereas the 23 test fish that started
with the defector tended to swim more
closely to the predator with the former co-
operator (p < .05, one-tailed f/test). There-
fore, the disturbance had a conservative ef-
fect with respect to the hypothesis and was
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most pronounced in the test run that im-
mediately followed the disturbance.
When the conditioned fish was in the half
of its compartment close to its start section
on its way back, the test fish also returned
from its inspection visit. This is depicted by
the test fish's greater distance to the pred-
ator (Figure 3) as compared to when the
conditioned fish was close to the predator
(Figure 2). However, the test fish returned
more slowly when it had started the inspec-
tion visit with the cooperator than with the
defector. During each of the training runs,
the test fish was significantly closer to the
predator with the cooperator than with the
defector (Figure 3). This was also the case
in each of the first two test runs. Thereafter,
the test fish reacted to the cooperator and
to the defector in the same way.
Discussion
Although we are using words such as "trust,"
we do not assume that our fish were con-
sciously trusting. What looked like trust may
have been simply the result of applying a
rule that generates behavior which has been
described as "nice, retaliating and forgiv-
ing" (Axelrod, 1984).
In the four training runs with either the
cooperator or the defector, the test stickle-
backs moved closer to the predator when
they were accompanied by the cooperating
partner. Because neither the cooperator nor
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Figure 2
Average (±SE) minimum
distance (cm) between the
test fish and the predator
when the conditioned fish
was in the half of its
compartment closer to the
predator during training
runs and test runs. Shaded
columns show runs with the
cooperator, unshaded
columns show runs with the
defector; n — number of
trials with different test fish,
n with missing values shown
in columns; p — significant
(<.O5) differences between
runs with cooperator and
defector after one-tailed
Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks test.
Figure 3
Average (±SE) minimum
distance (cm) between the
test fish and the predator
when the conditioned fish
was in the half of its
compartment close to its
start section on its return
during training runs and test
runs. Other explanations as
in Figure 2.
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the defector could see the test fish, it must
have been the test fish's decision to move
closer to the predator with the cooperator.
In both cases the test fish simply could have
followed the other fish. No cooperation
needs to be involved here, in contrast to
previous mirror experiments (Milinski, 1987)
in which the cooperating mirror image pro-
ceeded only when the test fish moved for-
ward. In the test runs, however, the test fish
saw both the former cooperator and the de-
fector approaching the predator up to the
defector's distance. The test fish moved clos-
er to the predator after the former coop-
erator had disappeared behind a partition
(i.e., defected), as had the defector. As both
the cooperator and the defector defected in
the test runs at exactly the same distance
from the predator, the test fish's closer ap-
proach to the predator can be interpreted
as "paying for trust." When a partner ap-
peared that had previously cooperated, the
test stickleback was willing to take the next
step toward the predator, which is equiva-
lent to "cooperate for cooperate" in the Tit
for Tat strategy.
Because the roles of defector and coop-
erator were alternated between the two con-
ditioned fish from test fish to test fish, the
experimental results were caused neither by
individual differences between the two con-
ditioned fish nor by a hidden asymmetry of
the tank. Although we cannot rule out that
each test fish learned on which side it could
expect its cooperator to appear, we have evi-
dence for individual recognition of the co-
operating partner from another study (Mi-
linski et al., in press).
The finding that the test fish continued
to cooperate with the former cooperator un-
til after this fish had defected twice suggests
that the sticklebacks were playing Tit for
Two Tats, a strategy that has been shown
to be more successful sometimes than Tit
for Tat (Axelrod, 1984; Boyd, Lorberbaum,
1987). However, it is possible that the num-
ber of defections, which are accepted before
a defection* is the answer, is a function of
the amount of "trust" that has been built
up. Possibly we would have found something
such as Tit for Four Tats after 10 training
runs with the cooperator. Furthermore, it
is possible that the fish use strategies with
some realistic stochasticity in them (May,
1987), such as cooperation with a probabil-
ity of 90% after the partner has defected
once, with a probability of 80% after its sec-
ond defection, and so on.
In a companion study (Milinski et al., in
press), it has been shown that sticklebacks
in gToups of four have preferred partners
with whom they cooperate repeatedly. The
present study suggests the mechanism by
which such reciprocal pairs may build up
trust. This is to make the next cooperative
step when the partners that follow are those
that had been seen to "pay in advance"
themselves. This study and previous ones
(Milinski, 1987, 1990; Milinski et al., in
press) have shown that the sticklebacks' be-
havior is compatible with a cooperation
strategy modeled on Tit for Tat. This does
not mean that a different cooperation strat-
egy could not explain the results better.
There is clearly a need for alternative strat-
egies against which Tit for Tat can be tested.
We thank Theo Bakker, Alex Kacelnik, and Anne Ma-
gurran for comments, and Olivia Lassiere for improv-
ing our English.
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